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BEYOND LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE:
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
TREATMENT FOR MENTALLY
DISABLED PERSONS IN THE
COMMUNITY
Jan C. Costello*
and James J. Preis**
I.

INTRODUCTION

These are challenging times for legal advocates of a right to community-based treatment services' for mentally disabled persons.' The optimism created by early "right to treatment" decisions3 mandating
sweeping reforms in institutional conditions has been eroded by the prevailing climate of "judicial restraint" 4 and "deference to professional
judgment."' Before the United States Supreme Court decided Youngberg
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. B.A. 1972, M.A.
1975, J.D. 1976, Yale University.
** Executive Director, Mental Health Advocacy Services, Inc., Los Angeles, California.
B.A, 1974, Stanford University; J.D. 1978, University of Southern California.
We wish to thank Jana Miller Brewer, Production Editor, for all her assistance, and Richard A. Rothschild, Nancy M. Shea and Dan Stormer, our co-counsel for plaintiffs in Mental
Health Association v. Deukmejian, for contributing to the theory that we advance in this
Essay.
1. "Community-based treatment" is defined at infra note 26.
2. The term "mental disability" includes individuals diagnosed as mentally ill and individuals who are developmentally disabled. See Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION (rev. 1983); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed.
1980). This Essay is concerned with those mentally disabled persons whose disability is severe
enough to prevent them from functioning independently in the community. These people,
because of their inability to function, come to the attention of the state through the criminal
justice or civil mental health systems; they are "mentally disabled enough" so that the state is
compelled to "do something about them."
3. See infra text accompanying notes 8-9 & 52.
4. See, e.g., Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo and Rogers: The Burger Court andMental Health
Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 348 (1983) (Supreme Court discouraging federal
courts from interfering with operation of state facilities for mentally disabled persons).
5. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes
94-103 for a discussion of post-Youngberg courts' interpretation of this phrase.
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v. Romeo,6 advocates could assert a combination of strict scrutiny and
clinical standards when they asked federal courts to order the develop-

ment of appropriate community-based treatment services and placements
for mentally disabled persons.

Several lower courts, appalled by the

conditions in institutions, and aware of the disappointing record of courtmandated and supervised reform, 8 enunciated a constitutional doctrine

of "right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative." 9 "Least restrictive alternative" became a catch phrase for community-based treatment
among mental health professionals and advocates."0
According to some courts and commentators, the Court in
6. 457 U.S. 307.
7. In asserting such a "right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative," advocates

equated "least drastic means" with community-based treatment. See generally Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111: PracticalGuides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108 (1972); Spece, Justifying InvigoratedScrutiny and the Least

Restrictive Alternative as a Superior Form of IntermediateReview: Civil Commitment and the
Right to Treatment as a Case Study, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 1049 (1979). Because involuntary
hospitalization caused severe loss of liberty, advocates argued that the state's purposes of treatment and protection of nondangerous mentally disabled persons could be fulfilled by nonhospital treatment. Therefore, mentally disabled persons had a constitutional right to receive
treatment in such less restrictive settings. See infra note 9; see also Chambers, supra, at 114551. See generally S. HERR, S. ARoNS & R. WALLACE, LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL
HEALTH CARE (1983).
8. See Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979); Dixon v.
Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). See generally Lottman, Paper Victories and HardRealities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND
HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (1976); Special Project, The Remedial Process in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784 (1978); Note, ImplementationProblems in
InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REv. 428 (1977); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a JudicialDecree OrderingInstitutionalChange, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
9. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d
657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1
(1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Pennhurst1]; see also Gary W. v.
Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979) (consent decree); Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F
(E.D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1978) (final consent decree), reprintedin 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
45 (1979), enforced, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982), aff'd as modified, 786 F.2d 16 (1st
Cir. 1986). As a result of the Brewster litigation, Massachussetts implemented a state-wide
plan of developing community programs and reducing institutional populations. See Community Based ResidentialServicesfor MentalHealth Clients,3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 150
(1979). See also Dixon, 405 F. Supp. 974.
10. Although least restrictive alternative is a legal concept, it has been used by mental
health professionals and service providers as a clinical term meaning community placement:
"Least restrictive" has taken on new meanings in the legal context in the past twenty
years. Because some of these meanings have had an impact on service providers, the
idea of "least restriction" has leaked into the lingo, where it has acquired new conno-
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Youngberg declared a narrower right to "minimally adequate treat-

ment," 11 thus eliminating any constitutional basis for a right to community-based services. Such a conservative reading emphasized the Court's
rejection of a "least intrusive means"' 2 test to determine the adequacy of

treatment provided to a severely mentally retarded person within an institution. These commentators would interpret the Court's admonition

of deference to "professional judgment" as shielding from court scrutiny
virtually any decision regarding placement of mentally disabled persons
in an institution. 3
Thus, an increasing number of courts find support in Youngberg for
the proposition that "there is no constitutional right to a least restrictive

environment"' 4 and thus no right to community mental health treatment. Other post-Youngberg courts find that for some mentally disabled
persons, community-based treatment is "minimally adequate"-and thus

constitutionally required where there is a professional consensus that
hospital confinement is inappropriate and community treatment appro-

priate. 5 These rulings, however, have thus far been applied only to inditations probably not intended by the lawyers who brought it into the vocabulary of
the human service professionals.
Perhaps the greatest problem faced by professionals in adopting the principle
has been the tendency to invoke stereotypic responses around "mainstreaming" and
"deinstitutionalization" as being, in themselves, mandatory and desirable for every
individual.
THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 41 (H. Turnbull, III
ed. 1981); see also Miller, The Least RestrictiveAlternative: Hidden Meanings and Agendas, 8
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 46 (1982) (debate over whether community facilities are
ipsofacto less restrictive than institutions).
The movement of developmentally disabled persons from large institutions into less restrictive community settings was supported by the "normalization principle." This principle
advocated the socialization of developmentally disabled persons by "the utilization of means
which are as culturally normative as possible, in order to establish and/or maintain personal
behaviors and characteristics which are as culturally normative as possible." S. BRAKEL, J.
PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 617 (3d ed. 1985) (citing
W. WOLFENSBERGER, B. NiRE, S. OLSHANSKY, R. PERSKE & P. Roos, THE PRINCIPLE OF
NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES 28 (1972)).

11. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322. For courts' varying interpretations of "minimally adequate treatment," see infra text accompanying notes 90-94 & 97-102.
12. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text & notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
13. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-23. Youngberg only requires deference to decisions made
by qualified professionals who actually exercise professional judgment. This Essay argues that
professional deference is not required where, for example, a state mental health administrator
limits available community placements for non-clinical reasons such as budgetary limits or
administrative convenience. See infra text accompanying notes 104-10.
14. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (2d Cir.
1984); see also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1249 (5th Cir. 1987).
15. Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 459 (1986); Thomas
S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1992 (1986) and 107 S.Ct.
235 (1986); Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 105-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 936 (1984);
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viduals who are or have been unnecessarily institutionalized. Such a
limited right cannot help mentally disabled persons who, although they
have never been involuntarily hospitalized, are at risk of losing their liberty through future hospitalization or whose liberty is restricted by other
forms of state action. Moreover, a right to adequate treatment should
not be conditioned on institutionalization.
We believe that both post-Youngberg interpretations are deficient.
After Youngberg, there may be no federal constitutional right to treatment "in the least restrictive setting." There is, however, a federal constitutional right to community-based treatment, where such treatment is
"minimally adequate" and institutionalization is not. 16 That constitutional right to community-based treatment belongs not merely to institutionalized mentally disabled persons, but also to those at risk of
institutional confinement, and those whose liberty is subject to other
forms of state restraint. This Essay will describe the right to communitybased treatment, explaining how it both builds upon and may be distinguished from the earlier "least restrictive alternative" right. It will critically analyze the post-Youngberg decisions, emphasizing their
identification of the liberty interests at stake, and their interpretation of
"minimally adequate" and "deference to professional judgment." Finally, by reconsidering the concept of "state restriction of liberty," it will
propose extending the right to community-based
treatment to noninstitu17
persons.
disabled
mentally
tionalized
IL

THE NEED FOR

A RIGHT To COMMUNITY-BASED TREATMENT

The search for a workable theory of right to community-based treatment is more than an intellectual diversion. Now, just as before
Youngberg, thousands of people with mental disabilities who could be
served in a community setting far less restrictive than a large institution
Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 487 (D.N.D.
1982), aff'd in part,modified and remandedon othergrounds, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
These courts stressed that they actually deferred to "professional judgment" in finding a right
to community-based services, since a professional consensus exists which mandates, as minimally adequate, treatment in the community for individuals who do not require hospitalization. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97 & 100.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 71-112.
17. Two earlier commentators have advanced theories of a right to treatment for mentally
disabled persons not confined in institutions. Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive
Treatment in the Community, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 193, 236-39 (1980); Note, The
Constitutional Right to Treatment Services for the Noncommitted Mentally Disabled, 14
U.S.F.L. REv. 675, 697-99 (1980). However, both articles were written before Youngberg.
The first relies on a quidpro quo analysis; the second assumes a constitutional right to treatment "in the least restrictive setting." See Rapson, supra, at 236-39; Note, supra, at 697-99.
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remain hospitalized."i Thousands more find themselves in the community without the treatment and support they need to survive.19 This lack
of treatment and support is the result, in large part, of states' failure to
shift mental health resources into the community when large state institutions drastically reduced their populations by discharging patients and
limiting bed capacity.
The policy of treating mentally disabled persons in the community
rather than in institutions to the maximum extent possible is referred to
as "deinstitutionalization."I2 Its avowed purpose, to provide more appropriate treatment in the community for mentally disabled persons, has
18. For example:
In 1980, there were approximately 1.8 million episodes of psychiatric in-patient care
in the specialty mental health sector and an estimated 1 million or more episodes in
the general medical sector. Although the vast majority of hospital stays are for less
than 30 days, approximately 125,000-150,000 individuals are long term residents (1
year or longer) of psychiatric hospitals.
REV. GEN. PSYCHIATRY, (H. Goldman ed. 1984), reprinted in 1 MENTAL HEALTH LAW
PROJECT, PROTECTION & ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE LABELED MENTALLY ILL 55,

58 (1987). See also Goldman, Taube, Regier & Witkin, The Multiple Functions of the State
Mental Hospital, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 296 (1983).

"Put another way, the answer to the policy question, Are we institutionalizing too many
people?, ...

studies ...indicate a very clear and unqualified yes." Kiesler, Mental Hospitals

and Alternative Care-Noninstitutionalizationas PotentialPublicPolicyfor MentalPatients,37
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349, 358 (1982); see H. Lamb, Deinstitutionalizationand the Homeless
Mentally Ill, in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 55 (H. Lamb ed. 1984) (professional literature shows that it is possible to maintain even severely disabled persons in the community with
adequate funding and program design).
19. In Los Angeles County, approximately 35,000-50,000 chronically mentally ill people
are not receiving treatment services and are at risk of being rehospitalized. Opening Brief for
Appellants at 4, Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr.
130 (1986) (No. 2 Civ. B 014479) (ordered depublished) (citing trial court Statement of Decision, Finding 16). See infra note 24.
20. Deinstitutionalization began in the 1950's in response to a variety of diverse factors.
The first of these was the introduction of psychotropic medications. "Psychotropic [medications] are chemical agents that have an effect on the mind." R. WALDINGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 396 (1986). They fall into three major groups: antipsychotic agents,

antidepressants and antimanic agents. Id. at 397. Accompanying the use of medications was
the development of a professional consensus that the long-term warehousing of mentally disabled persons in state institutions was dehumanizing and harmful. See S. HERR, THE NEW
CLIENTS: LEGAL SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 16 (1979); Kiesler, supra

note 18, at 350-51. See generally E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961). Moreover, courts began to
recognize that institutionalized persons have civil rights. See generally Developments in the
Lan-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974); see also infra text
accompanying notes 50-51 for a discussion of procedural due process cases. Additionally,
fiscal conservatives viewed deinstitutionalization as a way to save state resources and shift
fiscal responsibility onto federal programs, i.e., community mental health centers, Medicare,
Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income and Social Security Disability Insurance. All of
these factors contributed to a massive shift of mentally disabled persons into the community,

in which the population in state mental hospitals was reduced from approximately 560,000 in
1950 to less than 140,000 in 1980. Goldman & Morrissey, The Alchemy of Mental Health Pol-
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not been realized.2 1 The result is that today thousands of mentally dis-

abled persons, who once would have been "treated," albeit inappropriately in large institutions, now find themselves in the community without
any services or support. 22 They are often drawn into a cycle of multiple

hospitalizations, short-term involuntary treatment and release known as
"the revolving door." The term "revolving door" graphically describes
the plight of the chronically mentally disabled as they deteriorate in the

community to the point where they are admitted in acute crisis to a hospital, oftentimes via the local jail. They are then stabilized on medication
in the hospital and released with no discharge planning or aftercare services. Without treatment or community support services, they again de-

compensate to the point of requiring hospitalization, revolving
continuously back and forth between hospitals and the streets.2 3

Thus, for many mentally disabled persons, the continual intrusiveness of institutional life has been replaced by absolute neglect, punctuated by periods of acute state intervention through short-term civil

commitment or incarceration via the criminal justice system. This neglect has reached the public consciousness as a result of publicity sur-

rounding the "mentally disabled homeless."124 The likely political
icy: Homelessness and the Fourth Cycle of Reform, 75 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 727, 728

(1985).
21. By the 1970's, the deinstitutionalization movement was being severely criticized for
"dumping" mentally disabled persons into the community without adequate treatment and
support. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE
COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO Do MORE (1977); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
MENTAL HEALTH: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 4-5 (1978); Mills & Cummins, Deinstitution-

alization Reconsidered, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 271, 277 (1982); Rhoden, The Limits of
Liberty. Deinstitutionalization,Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375
(1982).
22. Some of these people end up in jails, inadequate board and care homes, locked skilled
nursing facilities, or welfare hotels. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 10 (citing
Bassuk & Garson, Deinstitutionalizationand Mental Health Services, 238 Sci. AMER., Feb.
1978, at 46). Some are homeless. Some are caught in the cycle of hospitalization, release and
rehospitalization known as "the revolving door." Those who are severely developmentally
disabled or "hard-core" chronically mentally ill, are still subjected to long-term institutional
confinement. For statistical information on the developmentally disabled populations in institutions versus community programs, see Braddock, Deinstitutionalizationof the Retarded:
Trends in Public Policy, 32 Hosp. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 607 (1981); Braddock &
Heller, The Closure of Mental Retardation Institutions: Trends in the United States, 23
MENTAL RETARDATION 168-76 (1985).
23. Opening Brief for Appellants at 5, Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App.
3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986) (No. 2 Civ. B 014479) (ordered depublished).
24. See, e.g., Morganthau, Agrest, Greenberg, Doherty, Raine, Abandoned, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 6, 1986, at 14; Nickerson, Reformers' Dream That Went Astray, Boston Sunday Globe,
Mar. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Crimes of Neglect, (PBS television broadcast, July 23, 1986) (transcript on file at Loyola Law School library).
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response, however, will be greater involuntary restrictions on liberty2"
rather than the creation of an adequate community-based treatment system. We define "adequate community-based mental health system" as
one which provides treatment and support services to enable mentally
disabled persons to preserve and exercise liberty.26 For these people, liberty means avoiding confinement in a hospital or other institution and,
equally important, functioning in the community as an autonomous person to the maximum extent possible, given the limits of their disabilities.
These goals are mutually dependent. Providing appropriate treatment
and support services in the community will substantially reduce the risk
of confinement in an institution-both the risk of initial hospitalization
and of being caught in the revolving door.27 Staying out of the hospital
will increase the chance of meaningful involvement in the community for
mentally disabled persons. In addition, an adequate community system
will reduce many of the problems caused by the cycle of frequent rehospitalization such as interruptions in work and living arrangements, and
28
problems in establishing and maintaining personal relationships.
25. There are already attempts by states to modify civil commitment statutes in order to
make it easier to involuntarily confine mentally disabled persons. See, eg., Durham and La
Fond, The EmpiricalConsequences and Policy Implicationsof Broadening the Statutory Criteriafor Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 395, 398 (1985), see also Stromberg &
Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
275 (1983). Other possibilities include forcing mentally disabled persons to accept treatment
outside institutions, by devices such as conservatorships and outpatient commitments. See
Schwartz & Costanzo, Compelling Treatmentin the Community: DistortedDoctrines and Violated Values, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1329 (1987).
26. An adequate system of community-based treatment provides a full continuum of services of varying degrees of restrictiveness. The trial court in Mental Health Ass'n v.
Deukmejian, No. CA 00540 slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. May 8, 1985), aff'd, 186 Cal. App. 3d
1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986) (ordered depublished), found that:
A full continuum of services, according to all the expert testimony, would include:
appropriate long-term hospitalization, 24-hour acute intensive care, short-term crisis
residential care, 24-hour transitional care, long-term rehabilitative care, out of home
placement, emergency service and evaluation, acute day treatment, outpatient services, case management, community support services, community outreach services,
mental health, advocacy, and foster family care.
Id. at 7.
27. For effectiveness of appropriate programs in breaking the revolving door cycle and
reducing the recidivism rate, see Stein & Test, Alternative to Mental HospitalTreatment: ConceptualModel, Treatment Programand ClinicalEvaluation, 37 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY, 392 (1980); Test & Stein, Trainingin Community Living: Research Design and Results, in
ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HOSPITAL TREATMENT (1978). For a critical summary of the
research in this area, see Mills & Cummins, supra note 21, at 276.
28. Test & Stein, supra note 27. The trial court in Mental Health Ass'n, No. CA 00540,
slip op., found that: "Appropriate alternative programs and services less restrictive than state
hospitals will substantially reduce the rate of rehospitalization and therefore the risk of inappropriate confinement." Id. at 5.
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So long as fiscal conservatives remain in control, it is unlikely that
such a system will be developed solely through the political process. A
judicially enforceable right to adequate community-based treatment for

mentally disabled persons is therefore essential.
III.

SOURCES OF

A

RIGHT

To

COMMUNITY-BASED TREATMENT

A right to community-based treatment can have a statutory or constitutional basis in state or federal law. For a statutory right to be successfiliy asserted, a court must (1) find that the statute creates a right to
treatment services and (2) have the authority to grant the relief.2 9 In
Arizona, a superior court granted declaratory and injunctive relief based
on a finding that a combination of several state statutes established a
right for chronically mentally ill persons to receive community-based
treatment services.3 ° In California, however, an appellate court rejected
similar state law arguments, holding that the statutory scheme created a
29. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) [hereinafter Pennhurst II] (Eleventh Amendment precludes enforcement by federal court of state law against
state official). The history of two pre-Pennhurst11 cases, a consent decree and a judgment,
illustrates the importance of the court's authority to order compliance. See Brewster v.
Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882 (D. Mass. 1981), vacated and remanded, 687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir.
1982), on remand, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982), aff'd as modified, 786 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.
1986); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979); later proceeding, 466 F.
Supp. 479, aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979); later proceeding, 492 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980); later proceeding, 551 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); later proceedig, 727 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1984). But see Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1255 (5th Cir.
1987) (district court could not enforce consent decree beyond guarantees contained in federal
Constitution and laws simply because it was consent decree). A case upholding the authority
of a state court to enforce a state statutory right is Klostermarm v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463
N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1984). There the court reasoned: "If a statutory directive is
mandatory, not precatory, it is within the courts' competence to ascertain whether an administrative agency has satisfied the duty that has been imposed on it by the Legislature and, if it has
not, to direct that the agency proceed forthwith to do so." Id. at 531, 463 N.E.2d at 590, 475
N.Y.S.2d at 249.
30. Arnold v. Sam, No. C 432455 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1985), appeal docketed, No.
ICA-CIV 9262 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 1986). For a discussion of this case, see Santiago,
Gittler, Beigel, Stein & Brown, Changinga State Mental Health System Through Litigation:
The Arizona Experiment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1575-79 (1986) [hereinafter Santiago]. The
Arizona Revised Statutes require the director of the Department of Health Services to provide
"[u]nified mental health programs, to include,... the functions of the state hospital and community mental health." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-104(1)(c)(i) (1986). The director must
also "[t]ake appropriate steps to provide health care services to the medically dependent citizens of this state." Id. § 36-104(17). With respect to mental health care, the county "has the•
sole and exclusive authority to provide for ... medical care of the indigent sick .... " Id. § 11291(A) (Supp.). In presenting their case to the court, the plaintiffs' attorneys argued that these.
and other statutes imposed mandatory duties to provide services to the chronically mentally ill
in the community. Santiago, supra, at 1575.
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legislative preference for community-based treatment, not a right.3 1
Moreover, even if a right to such treatment existed, the trial court held
that it lacked authority to enforce it, because judicial enforcement would
impinge upon the powers reserved to the executive and legislative
branches of government.3 2 A right to community-based treatment may
also be asserted under a federal statute on a theory of entitlement to serv-

ices. 33 Arguably, federal anti-discrimination statutes provide another
possible basis for a right to services for disabled persons, in that such

services are necessary to enable disabled persons to function in society
equally with non-disabled persons.3 4
31. Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986)
(ordered depublished). Id. at 1548, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 140. The court affirmed the trial court's
finding that the California Lanterman-Petris-Short Act stated only a legislative preference for
community-based treatment, not a right. Id. at 1536, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 132. That statute
provides:
It is the intent of the Legislature that persons with mental illness shall have rights
including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) A right to treatment services which promote the potential of the person to
function independently. Treatment should be provided in ways that are least restrictive of the personal liberty of the individual.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1(a) (West 1984).
The court of appeal reasoned that the legislature could not have intended to create a right
because the mental health budget was not substantially increased at the time the legislation
was enacted. Mental Health Ass'n, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1540, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35. But see
Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 535-37, 463 N.E.2d at 593-94, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53 (action
claiming that mentally ill patients' rights were violated when released from institution without
program ensuring continued treatment and adequate housing presented justiciable controversy
which could not be defeated by argument that adjudication would require expenditure of funds
and allocation of resources). Cf. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Servs., 38 Cal. 3d 384, 696 P.2d 150, 211 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1985) (limited budget available
did not affect existence of developmentally disabled persons' statutory right to services).
32. Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, No. CA 000540, slip op. at 10 (Cal. Super. Ct.
May 8, 1985), aff'd, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986) (ordered depublished).
The court of appeal did not reach this issue.
33. The Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 creates an entitlement to
special education services for all disabled children who qualify. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420
(1982). However, the United States Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Pennhurst 1] found that the language of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982), created a mere preference, not a right, to receive treatment services in the least restrictive setting.
PennhurstI, 451 U.S. at 19.
34. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination based upon disability. 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982). The Rehabilitation Act's potential for establishing a right to community-based treatment has not been widely explored. In PennhurstI, the trial court relied on
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act along with many other statutory and constitutional bases in
finding a right to community-based treatment for residents at Pennhurst State School. Pennhurst 1, 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323-24 (E.D. PA. 1977). That federal statutory finding was not
addressed on appeal, either in Pennhurst I or Pennhurst II. In PennhurstI, the Court said it
would not reach the issue because it was focusing on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act. 451 U.S. at 11. In PennhurstII, the Court did not reach the issue
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State constitutions may also provide a right to community-based
treatment, where their provisions protect liberty and privacy rights, and
include a due process clause or its equivalent. At a minimum, such

provisions offer the same protection as their federal counterparts. However, in some jurisdictions, state constitutions may provide greater rights
for mentally disabled persons. 36 This is especially so if the state courts
construe the constitution as mandating strict scrutiny of state actions

which impinge upon fundamental rights of mentally disabled persons.3 7
Using a strict scrutiny analysis, a court could compel the state to accomplish its legitimate purposes of the treatment and protection of mentally

disabled persons by the means least restrictive of their fundamental
rights.3 8 For most mentally disabled persons, that "means" is community-based treatment.3 9
because of the eleventh amendment issue. In Clark v. Cohen, a federal court of appeals upheld
the trial court's denial of the § 504 claim where developmentally disabled plaintiff's argument
was that the state discriminated against her on the basis of her handicap. However, the evidence showed only that other similarly disabled persons had been placed in community residences and plaintiff had not been so placed. 794 F.2d 79, 84 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 459 (1986). But see Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981); Kentucky Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ky. 1980), aff'd, 674 F.2d 582 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041 (1982). See also New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v.
New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982) (section 504 requires special education to be given
in public schools to handicapped children); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
35. See generally Friesen, Recovering Damagesfor State Bills ofRights Claims, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 1269 (1985).
36. See Perlin, State ConstitutionsandStatutes as Sources of Rightsfor The Mentally Dis.
abled: The Last Frontier?,20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1249 (1987).
37. The California Supreme Court, relying on the state due process clause, found greater
procedual protections mandated for mentally disabled persons than did the United States
Supreme Court using the federal Constitution. Compare Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal.
3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979) (requiring proof of mental disability beyond
reasonable doubt) with Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (standard of proof is "clear
and convincing" under the fourteenth amendment and due process does not require proof
beyond reasonable doubt) and In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr.
298 (1977) (required a precommitment hearing for minors) with Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979) (precommitment hearing not necessary).
38. In finding the substantive due process right, a state court may look to the language of
the state commitment statute for evidence of the state's purposes. For example, if the state law
says that mentally disabled persons are to receive individualized treatment, or treatment in the
least restrictive setting, or treatment in ways that are least restrictive of personal liberty, such a
purpose reinforces the substantive due process right to avoid unnecessary institutional confinement, and to have the risk of such confinement reduced, by receiving community-based treatment. See, eg., the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, ILL. ANN, STAT. ch.
911/2, 2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987) ("A recipient of services shall be provided with adequate
and humane care and services in the least restrictive environment, pursuant to an individual
services plan .... ").
39. State courts have used such an analysis in restricting commitments of mentally dis-
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The final source of an enforceable right to community-based treatment is the federal Constitution which, although limited by Youngberg v.
Romeo' and some of its progeny, should not be abandoned. Although
the other sources discussed above have in some cases provided adequate
bases for successful enforcement of a right to community-based treatment,41 they are not without limitations. In many states the use of state
constitutions to enforce civil rights is a relatively new phenomenon. In
light of the dearth of state case law to assist in constitutional interpretation, state courts may rely heavily on federal law to interpret state constitutional provisions.' Statutorily-based rights to treatment services are,
of course, subject to change at the will of the legislature. State courts
may be reluctant to order state officials to implement state statutory and
constitutional rights.43 Furthermore, relief is not available in federal
abled persons to those which are "truly necessary," and in mandating procedural protections
to avoid "unnecessary" loss of liberty. However, the transition from procedural to substantive
due process is a difficult one. The closest step taken by California was in Conservatorship of
Early, 35 Cal. 3d 244, 673 P.2d 209, 197 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1983). The state supreme court found
that a mentally disabled person could not be placed under conservatorship and hospitalized if
he or she could care for basic needs alone or with the assistance of others. Id. at 254-55, 673
P.2d at 215, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 545. In rejecting an interpretation of the conservatorship statute
under which the proposed conservatee would have to provide for basic needs without assistance, the court pointed out that few non-mentally disabled persons could meet such a test.
We all depend, to varying degrees on the assistance of others (e.g., parents, mechanics, the farmer, the tailor) to make our way in the world. Where willing and responsible others are able to assist a person in providing his or her basic personal needs the
person is not, in our view, "truly unable to take care of [himself or herselfi."
Id. at 251, 673 P.2d at 213, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (quoting Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal.
3d 219, 225, 590 P.2d 1, 4, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428 (1979) (brackets in original). The court
applied a necessity test, as required by strict scrutiny, and found that where conservatorship
and hospitalization and the concomitant loss of liberty were not necessary to satisfy the state's
interests, they could not be imposed. Id. at 253-54, 673 P.2d at 215, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
40. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
41. See Arnold v. Sam, No. C 432455 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Mar. 14, 1985), appeal docketed,
No. ICA-CIV 9262 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 1986); see also Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171
(D. N.H. 1981); Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Coan, 510 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ky.
1980); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F.
Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
42. See Perlin, supra note 28, at 1275.
43. Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, No. CA 000540 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 8, 1985)
(trial court decision) (court of appeal did not reach issue whether separation of powers precludes judicial enforcement of right to community-based treatment), aff'd, 186 Cal. App. 3d
1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986) (ordered depublished). But see Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d
531, 629 P.2d 935, 174 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1981) (although separation of powers doctrine may
restrict a court from directly ordering the legislature to enact appropriations, it does not preclude the court from ordering state officials to expend appropriations consistent with the requirements of law); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Cory, 132 Cal. App. 3d 852,
183 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1982) (consistent with separation of powers doctrine, courts may intervene
to enforce compliance of public officials with the law); Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525,
535, 463 N.E.2d 588, 593, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 252 (1984) (deinstitutionalized mentally ill per-
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court to enforce state law claims.' For these reasons, it is preferable to
find a basis in federal constitutional law for the right to community-based
treatment services.
IV.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A.

Liberty Interest

The first step in developing a theory of constitutional right to community-based treatment for mentally disabled persons is to show that a
liberty interest is at stake. We begin with the premise that no constitutional right to treatment will be upheld unless it is grounded in a deprivation of liberty. Attempts to obtain a minimal level of publicly-funded
services as a matter of constitutional right have generally failed.4 The
Supreme Court has consistently held that need alone is not a basis for
asserting a constitutional right;4 6 the State may choose not to serve a
needy population, i.e. mentally disabled persons, or to give priority to the
needs of another population.47 The most that courts have been willing to
concede is that, when the state does undertake to provide services, it
must do so in a manner consistent with due process of law. 4 8 Therefore,
sons and persons awaiting placement in community programs could proceed against state by
seeking declaratory relief in mandamus action, where plaintiffs sought "mere declaration and
enforcement of the individual's rights that have already been conferred by the other branches
of government").
44. PennhurstII, 465 U.S. 89. Cases restricting relief now available in federal court, given
eleventh amendment and other restrictions, include Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (res judicata bars raising federal § 1983 claim in federal court even
where claim not raised in prior state civil litigation because state preclusion law would bar
claim in subsequent state court lawsuit); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (no federal
procedural due process claim exists where state itself provides some remedy for deprivation);
see also Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1255 (underPennhurstI, federal district court was without jurisdiction to enforce consent decree where only source of right to community placement was state
law).
45. See, eg., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[The idea that
States may not confine the mentally ill except for the purpose of providing them with treatment is of very recent origin, and there is no historical basis for imposing such a limitation on
state power.") (footnote omitted).
46. The Court in Youngberg v. Romeo stated that "[a]s a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border." 457 U.S.
307, 317 (1982) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment)).
47. The Youngberg Court continued, "[n]or must a State 'choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.'" Id. at 317 (citing Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970)).
48. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For application to mental health systems, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980) (involuntary transfer of convicted felon
to mental hospital without adequate notice and opportunity for hearing deprived him of liberty
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simply asserting that mentally disabled persons are in need of treatment
in order to survive in the community is not sufficient to establish a consti-

tutional right to community-based treatment.49 Rather, such a constitutional right must be grounded in the liberty interests of mentally disabled
persons.
Liberty interests are the basis of Supreme Court decisions restricting
state justification for civil commitments0 and mandating procedural due
process protections in commitment hearings." Thus, advocacy efforts
without due process of law); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (state mental
health law authorizing confinement of harmless mentally ill does not establish constitutionally
adequate purpose for confinement); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (nature and
duration of confinement must bear reasonable relationship to legitimate state purpose).
49. Such a broad general right would be supported by a theory of "implied right." That is,
a mentally disabled person's right to liberty implies and contains a right to treatment services
necessary to enable him or her to exercise that liberty interest. As the Supreme Court noted in
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979): "One who is suffering from a debilitating
mental illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma." How
can an individual function autonomously in the community if a mental disability severely impairs his or her ability to provide for basic needs (such as food, clothing or shelter)? What is
the reality of life choices for an individual whose disability isolates him or her from society?
This emphasis could form the basis for a general constitutional right to whatever treatment
and services are necessary to enable the disabled person to have a meaningful opportunity to
function within society. Such an opportunity includes maximizing both the ability to make
choices and the range of choices available.
The argument that a person's mental disability impairs his or her autonomy of course has
also been used in support of involuntary confinement and treatment. Examples of this argument include Waithe, Why Mill Was For Paternalism,6 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 101, 109
(1983) (involuntary commitment will help to restore capacity to live a self-directed, self-governed life); Comment, The Right to Adequate Treatment Versus the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment: A Solution to the Dilemma of the Involuntarily Committed
PsychiatricPatient, 33 EMORY L.J. 441, 483 (1984) (patient should not have right to refuse
medication because only after treatment can he acquire ability to make competent decisions).
We find this proposition self-contradictory. To condition treatment (with the goal of achieving
in the future a "cure" or "true autonomy") on relinquishing the fundamental right of liberty is
antithetical to the very concept of autonomy. Nevertheless, we recognize the appeal of the
proposition in the current political climate and thus the danger that a broad "implied right"
theory of right to treatment may "prove too much." Therefore, we do not assert such a theory
within this Essay.
50. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 576 (state cannot, without more, confine a nondangerous mentally ill person capable of living outside an institution safely, alone or with the help of family
and friends); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (civil commitment constituted a
"massive curtailment of liberty"); see also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966) (no
justification for confining mentally ill persons when evidence of dangerousness questionable).
51. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (prisoner retained a "residuum of liberty"
which must be protected against wrongful transfer to a mental institution; due process required notice, hearing with independent decision-maker); Addington, 441 U.S. 418 (clear and
convincing evidence, rather than preponderance of the evidence, should be the standard of
proof in civil commitment proceedings because of the substantial loss of liberty involved).
Even in cases finding that minimal due process was satisfied, the Supreme Court conceded
the preciousness of the liberty interest at stake. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983)
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for disabled persons which stress the preciousness of the liberty right at

stake, rather
than the need for services, have a greater likelihood of
52
success.

Recognition of the important liberty interests abridged by confine-

ment in a mental institution forms the basis upon which commentators
and courts have suggested a constitutional right to treatment.53 The

Supreme Court has recognized that although commitment to a mental
hospital involves "a massive curtailment of liberty, ' ' 54 a "residuum of

liberty" survives that commitment.55 In Youngberg v. Romeo, 6 the
Court defined an involuntarily committed mental patient's liberty interest to include safety57 and freedom from bodily restraint.5 8 The Court

held that the plaintiff, Nicholas Romeo, was entitled to "minimally ade(due process not offended by D.C. statute under which not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity acquittees were automatically committed; legislature's assumption that any law violation constituted
proof of dangerousness was reasonable; liberty interest adequately protected by provision permitting acquitees to periodically challenge commitment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)
(minors have constitutionally protected liberty interest even though it is adequately protected
by post-admission evaluation by neutral mental health professional).
52. Not surprisingly, therefore, a limited "right to treatment" or "habilitation" was upheld pre-Youngberg where the right was closely tied to the deprivation of liberty. See, eg.,
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563
(1975); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F.
Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part,remandedin part sub nom., Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A CriticalAssessment and ConstructiveDevelopment of ConstitutionalRight to Treatment Theories, 20 ARiz. L. RFv. 1 (1978).
53. See generally Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Birnbaum, The Right
to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. RPv. 1190 (1974).
The most common form of the argument has been characterized as quidpro quo, i.e., the
state must provide treatment in return for the loss of one's liberty when involuntarily committed to a mental institution. See Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784. But see O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 586
(Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[t]he quid pro quo theory is a sharp departure from, and cannot
coexist with, due process principles"). A variation on this theory is that the civilly committed
person is entitled to treatment in return for being confined with lesser procedural protections
than are available to persons incarcerated in the criminal justice system. Rouse, 373 F.2d at
453. But see discussion in Spece, supra note 52, at 4-15.
54. Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 509.
55. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491-94; see also Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
56. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
57. Id. at 315 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)); see also New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (right to
freedom from harm as constitutional basis of treatment).
58. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)). The Court also recognized, as conceded by the state, a
liberty interest in adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. Id. at 315.
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A constitutional right to community-based treatment must build
upon the liberty interest enunciated in Youngberg. Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion described that interest in vivid, practical terms: "For
many mentally retarded people, the difference between the capacity to do
things for themselves within an institution and total dependence on the
institution for all of their needs is as much liberty as they ever will
know."' ° Justice Blackmun recognized that liberty means more than
mere freedom from restraint: it means the right to develop and maintain
the skills which will make possible the exercise of that freedom.
Thus, for a developmentally disabled person who is so severely impaired as to require institutional placement, the right to liberty includes
the right to learn self-care skills, and not to lose those skills possessed at
the time of confinement. 6 ' In Clark v. Cohen,62 Judge Becker, in his concurring opinion, extended Justice Blackmun's reasoning by concluding
that involuntarily committed persons have a right to treatment sufficient
to develop their ability to be independent, at least to the level which
would have been attained but for institutionalization.6"
The Youngberg majority assumed, and counsel for both sides conceded, that Nicholas Romeo could not function outside of an institution."4 Thus, the facts presented a situation in which a mentally disabled
person, confined in an institution, required treatment services in order to
exercise his liberty to any extent at all. Similarly, the plaintiff in Clark
had been confined in an institution and required training and suitable
placement in the community in order to be able to function outside the
institution.6"
The constitutionally-required protection of a mentally disabled person's liberty interest, however, does not and should not depend upon institutional confinement. In Thomas S. v. Morrow,66 the Fourth Circuit
recognized that liberty exists before commitment: "The liberty interests
59. Id. at 319 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 644 F.2d 147, 176 (3d Cir. 1980) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring)). "Training" or "habilitation" rather than "treatment" is the proper clinical term
to be used for a program designed to improve a developmentally disabled person's ability to
function. "Treatment" is used for mentally ill persons. However, for the purposes of the
constitutional argument, training/habilitation/treatment are interchangeable terms. Id. at 311
n.5 & 313 n.12.
60. Id. at 327 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986).
63. Id. at 96 (Becker, J., concurring).
64. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
65. Clark, 794 F.2d at 81.
66. 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986) and 107 S. Ct. 235 (1986).
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protected in Youngberg did not arise because of the institutional confinement. Rather, the Court's premise was that involuntary commitment
and other lawful confinement 'do not extinguish' pre-existing liberty interests in safety and freedom from bodily restraint."6 7
The Thomas S. court thus acknowledged that whether or not a mentally disabled person is confined in an institution, his liberty interest is a
constant, which must be protected against unconstitutional abridgement
by the state. Emphasizing that the plaintiff, a behaviorally-disordered
man, was dependent upon the state, the Fourth Circuit enunciated a constitutionally-based right to "minimally adequate treatment" in the

community.

68

Extension of the liberty interests set forth in Youngberg beyond the
institution and into the community follows from the reasoning of the
case itself. If the state must provide some mentally disabled persons with
"minimally adequate treatment" to enable them to exercise their liberty
within an institution, other mentally disabled persons are entitled to the
treatment services that would allow them to maintain and exercise their
liberty in the community. If "minimally adequate treatment" would
make the difference between institutional confinement and life in the
community for a mentally disabled person, Youngberg provides a solid
due process argument for a right to such treatment.
At first glance, this argument seems similar to the broad "needsbased" right to treatment theory rejected earlier. 69 Both theories define
the treatment as that which is needed in order for mentally disabled persons to exercise their fundamental rights. The critical difference is that
the Youngberg right to "minimally adequate treatment" is triggered, not
solely by the person's need, but by the state's abridgment of liberty plus
the person's need. If state restriction, as argued below, 70 is not limited to
institutional confinement, then liberty, as defined in Youngberg and extended in Clark v. Cohen and Thomas S. v. Morrow, is sufficient to support a right to treatment in the community.
B. Minimally Adequate Treatment and the Right to CommunityBased Treatment
A right to adequate community-based treatment may be built upon
the constitutional right to "minimally adequate treatment" declared by
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 374 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982)).
Id. at 374-76.
See infra text accompanying notes 45-49
See infra text accompanying notes 118-31.
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the Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo.7 1 The Court held that
Nicholas Romeo, a severely mentally disabled man civilly committed to
a state institution, was entitled to such "minimally adequate treatment"
as was "reasonable in light of [his] liberty interests in safety and freedom
from unreasonable restraints,I 72 balanced against the state's interests.73
The Supreme Court in Youngberg rejected the lower court's use of
the "least intrusive means" test to evaluate whether the treatment offered
to Nicholas Romeo passed constitutional muster. 74 Rather than apply
the traditional strict scrutiny analysis to restrictions on the liberty of institutionalized persons, the Court used a simple balancing test: Nicholas
Romeo's liberty weighed against the state's interests in carrying out the
purposes of his civil commitment. 75 Thus, in Youngberg, the test of constitutional treatment was not its degree of intrusiveness, but its reasonableness. In deciding whether the treatment provided by the state is
"reasonable," the Court counseled deference to decisions made by a qualified professional, for a course of treatment consistent with professional
' 76
standards. The Court deemed such decisions "presumptively valid."
Therefore, a treatment decision made by a qualified professional for a
course of treatment which, although "professionally acceptable," was not
the least restrictive of a disabled person's liberty, could satisfy the
Constitution.
The Court's failure to adopt the "least intrusive means" analysis
should not be interpreted as an undervaluing of the liberty interest at
stake. To the contrary, Nicholas Romeo's liberty was both the source
and the measure of his right to "minimally adequate treatment." The
Youngberg Court recognized the state's duty to "provide [him] with such
training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily
restraints. '77 Thus, an institutionalized mentally disabled person is entitled to "minimally adequate treatment" which will enable him to enjoy
the "constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care
78
and safety, [and] reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions.
71. 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
72. Id.
73. Those state interests included protection of other institutional residents and effective
administration of institutions. Id. at 320.
74. Id. at 322.
75. Id. at 324.
76. Id. at 322-23.
77. Id. at 324.
78. Id. Justice Blackmun asserted in his concurrence that institutionalized persons were
further entitled to that treatment "as is reasonably necessary to prevent a person's pre-existing
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The Court in Youngberg did not address "the difficult question
whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state
institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se, even
when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. 7' 9 Nicholas
Romeo sought only the treatment necessary to enable him to exercise the
liberty he retained within the institution where he assumed that he would
spend the rest of his life. Within the context of Youngberg itself, therefore, a "least restrictive" or "least intrusive" means standard was proposed-and rejected by the Court-solely as a measure of the
constitutional adequacy of treatment within an institution. Nicholas Romeo never asserted a "least restrictive means"/strict scrutiny argument
entitling him to placement and treatment in the community.
These facts could justify a narrow reading of Youngberg: the decision only sets out a test for damages liability where a state institution
mental health professional is sued." ° Its chief concern is to keep federal
courts from interfering with the day-to-day operation of state institutions;"' and its admonished "deference to professional judgment" is only
a starting point from which to assess adequate treatment.8 2 It is tempting to try in this way to minimize the harm that Youngberg could pose to
the right to community-based treatment, so that advocates may continue
to rely upon earlier court decisions which used a strict scrutiny analysis
in finding such a right.8 3
self-care skills from deterioratingbecause of his commitment." Id. at 327 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 318.
80. Id. at 323. The majority stated:
[L]iability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment. In an action for damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal
professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, goodfaith immunity would bar liability.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781
F.2d at 375, underscored the fact that the Supreme Court did not extend the lack of funds
defense to "prospective injunctive relief."
81. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322. The Court stressed that its admonition of deference to
professional judgment was intended to minimize "interference by the federal judiciary with the
internal operations of [state mental] institutions." Id. The Court added that hospital "administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make each decision
in the shadow of an action for damages." Id. at 324-25.
82. See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J., concurring).
There, Judge Adams viewed the "professional judgment" language of Youngberg as "primarily
a starting point for defining the constitutional rights at stake," id. at 271, suggesting that it is
not the sole factor to be weighed in considering the "reasonableness" of the state's action. Id.
83. See supra note 9.
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However, most post-Youngberg courts have not read the case narrowly. They have looked beyond its facts and explicit holding and
reached broad conclusions about what "deference to professional judgment" and "minimally adequate treatment" mean. Post-Youngbergdeci-

sions fall into two groups. The first group of cases interprets Youngberg
as foreclosing any constitutionally-based right to treatment services in

the community.84 Decisions in the second group find that such a right is
not precluded but is actually supported by the Court's definition of "min-

imally adequate" treatment as that which is consistent with prevailing
professional standards. Since courts have read Youngberg so broadly and

inconsistently,85 their reasoning must be examined.
The first group of cases emphasizes Youngberg's rejection of the
"least intrusive means" analysis. 86 These decisions find that there is no

constitutional right to "community placement or a 'least restrictive environment' under the federal Constitution."87 Since they equate "least re84. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. Several other courts, while stressing the
Youngberg Court's rejection of "least intrusive means," either did not reach the constitutional
right to community-based treatment issue or granted relief on non-constitutional grounds. See
Johnson v. Breije, 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983), where the Seventh Circuit stated explicitly
that it was not ruling on whether there exists a federal constitutional right for criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity to be treated in the least restrictive setting. Since an
Illinois statute provided such a right, the Seventh Circuit found that the prisoners enjoyed a
state-created liberty interest requiring procedural due process protections against being inappropriately placed in a more restrictive treatment environment. Id. at 1205 & n.3. In Sabo v.
O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1984), the federal district court ruled only that
summary judgment was precluded where a question existed whether state officials had deprived the plaintiff of minimally adequate treatment within an institution. See also Woe v.
Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 936 (1984). In Woe, appellants had raised
as a genuine issue of material fact whether treatment at one mental institution was "minimally
adequate." Id. at 107. Although these courts did not reach the merits of the federal constitutional claim, these decisions have been cited by the group one post-Youngberg courts in support of their holding that there is no constitutional right to community-based treatment. See,
e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (2d Cir.
1984); see also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1250-51 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Society for
Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984)).
85. The ideal federal constitutional argument, of course, would apply the traditional strict
scrutiny test and require the state to accomplish its legitimate purposes of treatment and care
for mentally disabled persons in the least restrictive setting. Although an argument can be
made that the strict scrutiny analysis survived Youngberg, federal courts generally have interpreted Youngberg as rejecting a least drastic means analysis. It is probable that courts will
continue to do so, until the Supreme Court specifically rules on the issue. See infra notes 86-87
and accompanying text.
86. Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1250; Societyfor Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1249;
Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983); Johnson, 701 F.2d at 1209; Sabo, 586
F. Supp. at 1139.
87. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1248; see also Lelsz, 807 F.2d
at 1251. ("It is therefore our conclusion that the federal constitution does not confer... a right
to habilitation in the least restrictive environment.").
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strictive alternative" with "community placement," these cases state that

institutionalization per se is not an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.8 8 According to this view, since "the due process clause only forbids

deprivationsof liberty without due process of law," institutional confinement which provides mere custodial care-as opposed to treatment
designed to improve the mentally disabled individual's condition--does
not violate the Constitution.8 9

The group one cases, in rejecting mentally disabled persons' claims
to a constitutional right to community placement, find that institutional
confinement is "minimally adequate" treatment. Ironically, in one case
this was because the developmentally disabled plaintiffs were so highfunctioning that the court decided they did not require training in order

to leave the institution. Under those circumstances, custodial care which
amounted to no habilitation training was "minimally adequate."9
In
two other cases, the courts found institutional placement "not unreason-

able" because there was disagreement between plaintiffs' and defendants'
experts as to whether institutional confinement was "minimally adequate."91 In essence, they assumed that after Youngberg, credible plain88. In Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, the court of appeals, applying
Youngberg's "minimally adequate" treatment requirement, found that severely retarded persons were not deprived of their constitutional rights by "mere residence in a school for the
mentally retarded." 737 F.2d at 1243. The Seventh Circuit, in Phillips,rejected the argument
that the state had a duty to develop community-based programs for high-functioning mentally
retarded individuals as an alternative to state-operated institutions. The court found that
plaintiffs, who had in the past resided in a private program and were now state institution
voluntary residents, did not need training and could choose to live independently in the community. 715 F.2d at 366-68.
89. Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1251 (emphasis in original); see also Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1250 ("Where the state does not provide treatment designed to
improve a mentally retarded individual's condition, it deprives the individual of nothing guaranteed by the Constitution; it simply fails to grant a benefit of optimal treatment that it is
under no constitutional obligation to grant.").
90. Phillips, 713 F.2d at 368. Given the plaintiffs' functioning ability, the mentally disabled persons had not been deprived of their right under Youngberg to receive training necessary to enable them to exercise their liberty interests. Id.
91. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1249. Construing Youngberg,
the Second Circuit stated, "we may not look to whether the trial testimony established the
superiority of a 'least restrictive environment' in general or of community placement in particular. Instead, we may rule only on whether a decision to keep residents at [the state institution] is a rational decision based on professional judgment." Id. Where experts testified at
trial only that some residents would be "safer, happier and more productive" in smaller residences, but not that the consensus of mental health professionals was that institutional confinement was inappropriate, the court found that plaintiffs' placement in an institution was not
unreasonable. Id. at 1248-49. The record did not support the trial court's order to place the
residents in smaller community facilities given the residents' severe impairment and that only
one resident had been found inappropriately placed. Id. at 1247 & n.5.
The Fifth Circuit, in Lelsz, found that it was error for the trial court to order state defend-
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tiffs' expert testimony to the contrary cannot rebut the "presumptive
valid[ity]" of a state administrator's decision to institutionalize.92 For
the group one courts, there is no right to community-based treatment
93
unless it is "not merely the best remedy.., but the only remedy."
The group two cases also acknowledge that "reasonableness" and
not "least restrictive alternative"/strict scrutiny determines, after the
Youngberg decision, whether institutional confinement is constitutional.94 However, these cases find a right to treatment services in the
community for those institutionalized persons as to whom there is a professional consensus that institutional care is inappropriate and community-based care appropriate. The federal district court in Association of
Retarded Children v. Olson,95 clearly set out the basis for a right to community-based treatment, post-Youngberg:
While the Youngberg decision does not directly address this
specific right [to community placement for mentally retarded
persons confined in state facilities], the Court's analysis indicates that it would reject an absolute right to the least restrictive alternatives .... Following this analysis, this court must
conclude that a constitutional right to the least restrictive
method of care or treatment exists only insofar as professional
ants to comply with the consent decree obligations to develop community-based programs
according to a schedule. 807 F.2d at 1247. The court disapprovingly noted that "[t]he [trial]
court chastised the State for foot-dragging and delay in implementing community placement,
and the court insisted that the 'feasible' plan for such furloughs developed by an expert retained in consequence of the class action was more 'convincing' than the rationale adduced by
the State." Id. at 1246.
92. The court in Lelsz opined that the Second Circuit in Society for Good Will to Retarded
Children reversed because of "the district court's willingness to substitute the judgment of
plaintiffs' experts for that of the state's experts, in contravention of Youngberg." 807 F.2d at
1251. Lelsz arguably expanded the Youngberg Court's presumption of validity to a "presumption of correctness." Id. at 1250 (emphasis added). The Lelsz phrasing suggests that administrators' decisions are presumptively "correct," while Youngberg holds only that such decisions
are presumed not to offend the Constitution.
93. Id. at 1250 n.9.
94. See, e.g., Rennie, 720 F.2d at 271. The Rennie court acknowledged that "[w]hat does
not appear to survive Youngberg is the least intrusive means test" but found that the Constitution still does not tolerate inappropriate deprivations of mental patient's liberty "for the administrative convenience of state institutions." Id; see also Association of Retarded Citizens v.
Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 486 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
95. 561 F. Supp. 473. The district court ordered state officials to devise and implement a
plan to reduce the population of two facilities for mentally retarded individuals by developing
adequate and appropriate community-based facilities and services and placing the individuals
in them. Id. at 494. The district court, while acknowledging Youngberg's rejection of "least
intrusive means," found a right to community-based treatment where there was a professional
consensus that such treatment was necessary to enable mentally disabled persons to exercise
their liberty. Id. at 488, 494.
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judgment determines that such alternatives would measurably
96
enhance the resident's enjoyment of basic liberty interests.
Following this reasoning, two other federal courts of appeals found

a constitutional right to community-based treatment for mentally disabled individuals as to whom there was a professional consensus that
institutional confinement was not, and could not be "minimally adequate" treatment.97 Clark v. Cohen involved a high-functioning mentally
retarded woman who had been inappropriately hospitalized for twentynine years,98 and who required assistance to develop the skills necessary

to function in the community. Thomas S. v. Morrow concerned a behaviorally-disordered plaintiff who had failed in a variety of inappropriate
placements.9 9 In both cases, the right to community-based treatment

was based on a clear professional consensus that (1)institutional confinement and treatment were not consistent with good professional standards

and (2) community-based care was. Under such circumstances, community-based treatment and "minimally adequate" treatment, are the same

thing; thus, the institutional confinement is unconstitutional and community-based treatment is required."co
96. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
97. Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986); Thomas S.,
781 F.2d 367.
98. Clark, 794 F.2d at 85-86. In Clark, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
mentally retarded woman's substantive due process rights had been violated because of her
inappropriate institutionalization, and ordered county defendants to develop, and state defendants to fund, a less restrictive community living arrangement in which she could receive appropriate treatment. Id. at 82, 87. The plaintiff on appeal did not assert a "constitutional right to
treatment outside an institution unrelated to any prior violation of her rights." Id. at 83. The
court of appeals therefore reasoned that the constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment enunciated in Youngberg was violated by plaintiff's continued confinement "in the face of
unanimous professional opinion that she should be placed in a far less restrictive environment." Id. at 87.
99. 781 F.2d at 369-70. Indeed, the fact pattern in Thomas S. is a classic illustration of
how because of financial and administrative factors, mentally disabled persons are placed in
inappropriate settings, despite a clear professional consensus as to the needed treatment services. Thomas was placed in foster homes, group homes for disturbed children, a state mental
institution, an emergency shelter, a rest home for the elderly, a group home for developmentally disabled adults, a rest home for elderly and emotionally ill adults and a detoxification and
night care facility. In all, Thomas lived in more than forty foster homes and institutions prior
to the district court judgment. Id. at 369-73.
100. In Clark, case workers employed by the defendant state institution had recommended
community living for Carolyn Clark for nine years, and had consistently found continued
institutionalization inappropriate. 794 F.2d at 85-86. Similarly, in Thomas S., the
caseworkers responsible for placement agreed that Thomas required placement in a less restrictive setting and that placement in an institution would be inappropriate. 781 F.2d at 37173.
Consensus distinguishes these cases from Society for Good Will to Retarded Children and
Phillips. The Fourth Circuit in Thomas S. noted this distinction in declining to follow the two
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This second group of cases finds that a right to community-based
treatment may be asserted based upon professional consensus. However,
a more recent decision, Lelsz v. Kavanagh, took the position that professional consensus is not enough: courts can declare and enforce a right to
community-based treatment only for individual plaintiffs where there is
complete agreement between the parties that institutional confinement is
inappropriate. 10 Under this test it is questionable whether a court could
ever find that institutional confinement is not "minimally adequate" so
long as state experts testify to the contrary.' 0 2 Even where there is a
professional consensus that, for example, high-functioning developmentally disabled persons, or chronically mentally ill persons, should be
treated in the community, 0 3 Lelsz seems to deny relief to groups of mentally disabled persons.
Is there a way to permit a court to find institutional confinement not
"minimally adequate" for a group or, indeed, for an individual where the
cases. 781 F.2d at 375-76 ("[Tlhese decisions do not apply to the facts in Thomas's case, in
which a discrete recommendation for treatment was made by qualified professionals to meet
the needs of an individual, as contemplated by Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319 n.25 . .. ").
101. Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1249 n.9. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Clark and Thomas S. as
individual cases where there was only one appropriate placement for the mentally disabled
plaintiff.
Clark was an individual case where the only method to remedy the effects of the
unconstitutional confinement was community placement. In other words, community placement was not merely the best remedy for the plaintiff but the only remedy.
The Third Circuit did not grant carte blanche, a constitutional right to community
placement....
As in Clark, Thomas S. v. Morrow dealt with an individual situation ....
Thomas S. had the potentialto live independent of the state's care, but was unable to
live independently without minimal habilitation which involved a community setting. This community habilitation was not "better" care but the only way in which
the state could remedy its past transgressions against Thomas S.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, in Lelsz, even though defendants' experts
had agreed that community-based services were minimally adequate, the Fifth Circuit rejected
the consent decree below because it was not satisfied that for every mentally disabled person in
the affected group, community treatment was the "only" remedy. Id. at 1250-51.
102. The decisions in Phillips and Society for Good Will to Retarded Children illustrate the
difficulty in reaching consensus as to whether institutional confinement of severely mentally
retarded persons or of high-functioning developmentally disabled persons is inconsistent with
professional judgment. Phillips, 715 F.2d at 366-68; Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1243.
103. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd inpart and rev'd inpart,612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand,
673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Pennhurst I], there was professional consensus that
institutional confinement was unreasonable and that the developmentally disabled clients
should be in the community. Later the parent-intervenors challenged the professional consensus, especially with regard to severely disabled clients. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
& Hosp., 452 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (motion to intervene dismissed for lack of jurisdiction), aff'd, 612 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the parents' claims, see Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1259-60 (1983).
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state's experts have given their contrary "professional" opinion? The
state may argue that a state mental health administrator's decision to

concentrate resources in mental hospitals rather than in community programs is also a "professional judgment" with a presumption of reasonableness under Youngberg. We believe that a court may properly reject
state experts' testimony and need not defer to a state administrator's decision where the testimony or decision was not based upon profes-

sional-that is, clinical-factors. 1"
The Court in Youngberg did counsel deference to a qualified profes-

sional's decision for a course of treatment that was consistent with professional standards; such a decision is "presumptively valid."'

5

However, the Youngberg admonition must be read in conjunction with
its declaration of a constitutional right to "minimally adequate treatment." The Supreme Court quoted with approval the lower court opin-

ion of Chief Judge Seitz: "'It is not appropriate for the courts to specify
which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been

made.' "106 In order to satisfy the right to "minimally adequate" treatment, a mental health professional acting for the state must choose a
course of treatment which is "professionally acceptable." The mere fact
that a decision has been made by a mental health professional does not
satisfy the Youngberg test; the choice 7must be consistent with prevailing
10
professional standards and practice.
Since Youngberg, several federal courts of appeals have explicitly

rejected the idea that action by state-employed mental health professionals must be considered "reasonable" or "consistent with prevailing standards" without further scrutiny. 0 8 These courts distinguish decisions

made by mental health professionals on "non-professional" grounds,
104. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. See infra notes 108-10.
105. Id. at 322-23 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 321 (citing Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980)) (emphasis
added).
107. Id. at 323.
108. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Woe, 729 F.2d 96, emphasized the right and
obligation of a court to consider whether a challenged state action fell within the category of
exercise of professional judgment: "Youngberg did not suggest that the judgment of the state's
professionals was necessarily conclusive. On the contrary, the Court indicated that the testimony of Romeo's experts should have been admitted as relevant to the professional acceptability of the training he was receiving." Id. at 106 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
323 n.31 (1982)).
The Woe court demonstrated an awareness that the treatment of a person in a mental
institution does not always constitute a "professional decision" to be deferred to. The court
distinguished between "minimally adequate treatment" ("treatment that... accords with contemporary medical standards") and actual practice in state institutions. Id. at 98; see also
Societyfor Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1248, where the Second Circuit found
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such as economic constraints or administrative convenience, from the
kind of exercise of professional judgment deserving deference.1 0 9
Thus, where the decision to confine a mentally disabled person in an

institution is based upon a true exercise of professional judgment, it is
presumptively valid, and, unless the presumption is rebutted, confinement is "minimally adequate" treatment. Under such circumstances,

there is not a federal constitutional right to be treated outside of the institution. However, the presumption is rebuttable; courts can and should
consider evidence of prevailing standards of professional practice and reject decisions by state-employed professionals which do not meet those
standards.

Moreover, when an individual or a group is confined, not for clinical
reasons, but for administrative convenience or due to economic con-

straints, then the decision to confine is not "presumptively valid" under
Youngberg. Thus, a mental health professional's involuntary hospitalization of a person because "the hospital was the only placement available,"
or the state administrators' decisions to devote limited resources to state
institutions rather than community programs 10° should not be entitled to
it appropriate for the court to hear expert testimony "because [it] may shed light on what
constitutes minimally accepted standards across the profession."
The Third Circuit in Clark, 794 F.2d at 87, the Seventh Circuit in Johnson, 701 F.2d at
1209-10, and the Fourth Circuit in Rennie, 720 F.2d at 271, acknowledged that factors such as
administrative convenience and limited facilities could influence decisions made by mental
health professionals.
109. The Seventh Circuit in Johnson, 701 F.2d at 1209, reasoned that to satisfy the
Youngberg "professional judgment" criterion, it must determine that the state's decision to
place a prisoner in a more restrictive environment actually was an exercise of professional
judgment:
In this case, a "professional judgment" is not synonymous with a decision made
by a person "competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the
particular decision at issue." A judgment is not "professional" if it is not based on a
view as to how best to operate a mental health facility.
Id. at 1209 n.9 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982)) (citation omitted). Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in Rennie, distinguished between decisions to involuntarily
medicate patients on clinical grounds, and those made "on economic or administrative
grounds, as part of an attempt to 'warehouse' the patient." 720 F.2d at 274 (Seitz, J., concurring). Circuit Judges Weis, Higginbotham and Sloviter, also concurring in Rennie, made the
point more strongly:
[I]t is not enough to rely on a "professional judgment" unless it includes an evaluation aimed at the least intrusive means-a cost-benefit analysis viewed from the patient's perspective. ...
... [T]he least intrusive doctrine directs that professionals give greater consideration to the potential danger to the patient than to the state's administrative convenience or economic benefits.
Id. at 276-77 (Weis, J., Higginbotham, J. and Sloviter, J., concurring).
110. Since decisions which result in the institutionalization of a group are more likely to be
based upon non-clinical factors, they should be especially vulnerable to attack under this
reasoning.
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deference. Under these circumstances, in the absence of other compel-

ling evidence that the treatment provided in the institution is "minimally
adequate," due process provides a federal constitutional right to community-based treatment.

It is possible to use the Youngberg "reasonableness" test to support
a right to receive treatment services in the community. To do so, we
must show that the "minimally adequate" treatment to which mentally

disabled persons are entitled is the same thing as treatment in the community. We must show a professional consensus that, for all mentally
disabled persons capable of functioning outside an institution with assistance, institutional care cannot be "minimally adequate" treatment."'
Finally, to defeat the presumption that the state's decision to confine is

"reasonable," we must show that it was based on non-clinical factors,
and thus is not entitled to deference under Youngberg." 2

C. Restrictions on Liberty
Even if we establish that "minimally adequate" treatment can equal

"community-based treatment," whether for an individual or a group, our

task is only half done. The right to community-based treatment found by
courts since Youngberg v. Romeo I 3 has thus far been based upon the

mentally disabled person's institutional confinement. 1 4 This is consistent with due process analysis: the substantive protection of the fourteenth amendment does not attach without state restriction of liberty."'
Yet, a right to community-based treatment is of limited use if it is condi111. For evidence of a professional consensus that prolonged institutional treatment is not
appropriate for chronically mentally disabled persons, see Glick, Klar & Braff, Guidelinesfor
Hospitalization of Chronic Psychiatric Patients, 35 Hos,. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 9
(1984), reprinted in MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, PROTECTION & ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE LABELLED MENTALLY ILL 131, 131 (1987) ("[T]here are no data to support
the use of hospitalization rather than outpatient treatment for most chronic patients."); Talbott & Glick, The Inpatient Care of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 12 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
129 (1986) ("[C]urrent thinking holds that [long-term inpatient] treatment should be reserved
for a very few specific cases. Short-term inpatient treatment should be the rule for the majority
of chronic patients, as opposed to the acutely ill. .. ").
112. Advocates must show that the state expert's "professional standard" is limited to
"what is done in state hospitals." This would not be a fair measure of the profession's standards. See Woe, 729 F.2d at 98, where the Second Circuit deemed itself "forced ... to acknowledge that institutions for the mentally handicapped often do not provide treatment that
remotely accords with contemporary medical standards." Youngberg allows budgetary limits
as a defense against personal liability, but not against constitutional attack on state practices
themselves. Youngberg, 487 U.S. at 323.
113. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68 & 86-96.
115. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1250 (2d Cir.
1984); see also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1987).
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tioned upon institutionalization. The majority of mentally disabled persons with whom we are concerned are not presently involuntarily

confined; indeed, as institutional populations shrink, and mentally disabled persons live in the community in greater numbers, the greatest

need for community services may be among persons who have never been
hospitalized." 6 Thus, the second part of our task is to extend the constitutional right to community-based treatment to non-institutionalized

persons.
Where a mentally disabled person is subjected to the "massive curtailment of liberty" of involuntary hospitalization,' 17 the presence of restrictive state action is obvious. Not so obvious are the restrictions of
liberty that remain, even after a mentally disabled person is discharged
from an institution. More difficult to identify, yet equally real, are the

restrictions imposed by a state mental health system on a disabled person
who has never been hospitalized. We must identify those restrictions in
order to trigger the due process protection upon which rests the right to

community-based treatment for non-institutionalized persons.
Two post-Youngberg cases have recognized that state restriction on
liberty does not end when a mentally disabled person is released from an
institution. In both Clark v. Cohen and Thomas S. v. Morrow, the right
to community placement survived discharge from the institution, because

the mentally disabled plaintiffs continued to be dependent upon the
state.'

In addition, the Third Circuit found Carolyn Clark to be enti-

tled to community placement as reparation for past unlawful institutionalization."

9

Both cases, however,

relied upon

continued

state

involvement and concomitant restriction of liberty which began with the
involuntary confinement, and continues, albeit in diminished form,
116. In the future the problem will only increase, as the community will include "new"
schizophrenics, as well as chronically mentally ill persons with a history of multiple short-term
hospitalizations.
117. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). The loss of liberty involved in civil
commitment includes not only confinement but the stigma associated with commitment. Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979).
118. Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986); Thomas S. v.
Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986) and 107 S. Ct. 235
(1986). In both Clark and Thomas S., the mentally disabled persons could not simply have
been released from the institutions without further assistance from the state to enable them to
exercise their liberty. The Fourth Circuit emphasized Thomas S.' continued dependency upon
the state, Thomas S., 781 F.2d at 376; the Third Circuit stressed that Carolyn Clark, even after
discharge from the state institution, was under conservatorship and would need training to
overcome behavioral problems and skills deficiencies due to institutionalization. Clark, 794
F.2d at 97 (Becker, J., concurring).
119. Clark, 794 F.2d at 86.
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through conservatorship.1 20
Yet conservatorship and civil commitment are not the only means
by which the state can exercise such control over mentally disabled persons. The state, through operation of the mental health system itself,
determines to a great extent where and how mentally disabled persons
will live. Licensing requirements for community programs, contracts
with services providers, eligibility guidelines for public benefits 12 1-these
can determine whether a mentally disabled person is able to survive in
the community or is subjected to repeated institutional confinement.
Thus, state actions which lead indirectly to rehospitalization significantly
affect the liberty interests of mentally disabled persons who are dependent upon the state.
Like many other mentally disabled persons, Thomas S. and Carolyn
Clark required state assistance in order to be able to leave the institution.
However, assistance is also necessary to enable them to remain in the
community. Thomas S.' history of unsuccessful placements, and
Carolyn Clark's deficient living skills, demonstrate that they will need
training, supervision, economic and psychological support in order to
maintain themselves in the community. 122 That need for assistance in
order to avoidfuture institutionalconfinement is the source of their right
to community-based treatment.
The risk of future involuntary hospitalization is a different kind of
restriction on liberty from present institutional confinement. Nevertheless, for many mentally disabled persons caught in the "revolving
door," 123 it is a very real one. The crucial element of the revolving door
is that it is a closed system: the mentally disabled person, once drawn
into the mental health system, is thereafter constantly at risk of rehospitalization. This is not a hypothetical or far-fetched concern; the recidivism rate for persons identified as chronically mentally rn demonstrates
the seriousness of the risk. 124 For a person caught in the revolving door,
120. Id. at 97 (Becker, J., concurring) (Clark, even in the community placement, was still
involuntarily committed); Thomas S., 781 F.2d at 376 (ward of the state).
121. Rapson, supra note 16, at 237 (restrictiveness by state in less blatant manner in
community).
122. For a discussion of the ways in which adequate community-based services can enable
mentally disabled persons to function and to avoid unnecessary rehospitalization, see supra
notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
124. For example, the overall rehospitalization rates at Camarillo and Metropolitan State
Hospitals, two California state institutions, are very high. According to the most recent statistics available for 1985, 58.4% of patients admitted to Metropolitan and 49% of those admitted
to Camarillo had been previously hospitalized. Within Los Angeles County there is a rehospitalization rate of 16.7% within 30 days and 44% within 6 months. Opening Brief for Appel-
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just as for Nicholas Romeo, appropriate treatment and services are required to enable him or her to preserve and exercise liberty.
The state, by its enactment and enforcement of laws permitting involuntary commitment, restricts the liberty of mentally disabled person
caught in the "revolving door." The recidivism rate is evidence of the
real nature of that restriction. Therefore, persons in the revolving door
have a right to treatment services in the community to the extent that
they reduce the risk of loss of liberty through rehospitalization.
For mentally disabled individuals not part of the revolving door,
institutionalization may still pose a very real threat. Too often, if the
state perceives a mentally disabled person as a legitimate object of concern, under either the parenspatriaeor police power, the result will be a
deprivation of liberty. Historically, institutional confinement has been
the price exacted by the state from mentally disabled persons, in return
for custodial care. As Governor Wallace of Alabama acknowledged as a
defendant in Wyatt v. Aderholt, the "real clients" of the mental health
system are the police, parents, and members of the community who do
not want the responsibility of caring for-or learning to live with--disabled individuals.12
Because of this demand, the state will probably not "just leave
alone" mentally disabled persons perceived as non-dangerous but in need
of protection and treatment. Under parens patriae,either the state will
provide treatment services to enable them to function in the community,
or it will place them in an institution. 126
A mentally disabled person who comes to the attention of the state
through the criminal justice system, triggering the*police power, is also
likely to suffer a loss of liberty. If perceived as mentally disabled, he or
she may be charged with a crime "for his or her own good" to make
possible a transfer from the jail to the state hospital.27 A misdemeanor
charge may enable the court to order in-patient evaluation of competency
lants at 14, Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1986) (No. 2 Civ. B 014479) (ordered depublished); see also Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 764423-F (E.D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1978) (final consent decree), reprinted in 3 MENTAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 45, 45 (1979), which included in the definition of the plaintiff class, persons "at risk"
of confinement in the state hospital.
125. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974).
126. See Clark, 794 F.2d at 93-95 (Becker, J., concurring).
127. The court in Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, No. CA 000540 slip op. (Cal. Super.
Ct. May 8, 1985), aff'd, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1986) (ordered depublished), found that mentally disabled persons in Los Angeles County are involuntarily hospitalized through the practice known as "mercy bookings"; that is, police officers would arrest
mentally disabled persons in order to bring about their transfer from the jail to the mental
hospital. Id. at 5-6.
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to stand trial; such a commitment may extend to the maximum possible
sentence for the charged offense.12 8 An acquittal on insanity grounds
may yield the same result: confinement in a mental hospital for a fixed or
129
open-ended term, depending upon the law of the jurisdiction.
Mentally disabled persons whose disability is severe enough to attract the attention of the state, will surely have their liberty restricted in
some way. Their disability, combined with the risk of institutional confinement, make non-institutionalized persons dependent upon the state
for the protection and exercise of their liberty-just as were Thomas S.
and Carolyn Clark. Thus, even for non-institutionalized persons, the restrictions on liberty imposed by the state's mental health system, coupled
with a mental disability severe enough to carry a substantial risk of institutional confinement, may be shown to trigger the due process clause.
A "minimally adequate" system of community-based programs and
services, by increasing mentally disabled persons' ability to function in
the community, will reduce the risk of state restriction on their liberty
through the criminal justice or the civil mental health systems. Thus, the
right to "minimally adequate" treatment in the community may be asserted for mentally disabled persons who are now inappropriately hospitalized, who have been institutionalized and are trapped in the "revolving
door," or for those who, although never hospitalized, are dependent
upon the state for assistance and thus subject to state restrictions on their
liberty.
This argument, of course, goes far beyond the post-Youngberg case
law. Most of those decisions have been concerned solely with interpreting "minimally adequate" treatment; they have not considered what degree of restriction on liberty, other than institutional confinement, creates
a right to such treatment. Clark and Thomas S. may be cited for the
proposition that civil commitment to a community placement and conservatorship are sufficient state restrictions on the liberty of mentally disabled persons outside institutions to trigger the due process clause.
Arguably Thomas S.' history of failure in inappropriate community
placements shows that he was caught in the "revolving door."13 However, neither the Fourth Circuit nor any other court has ruled on the
question whether the "revolving door" population have a right to com128. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
129. See, eg., id. § 1370(a)(1). But see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69 (1983)
(District of Columbia statute was constitutional even though it permitted commitment of insanity acquittee beyond maximum time he would have served if convicted).
130. See supra notes 99 & 120.
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1
munity-based treatment based upon the risk of future confinement.1 3
Yet, this issue is critically important to the thousands of mentally dis-

abled persons at risk of involuntary hospitalization or incarceration as
criminals. That risk will continue to be acute in the absence of adequate
community-based treatment services. Therefore, we hope that advocates
and courts will consider the possibilities of a broader definition of restric-

tion on liberty, as a basis for a constitutional right to community-based
treatment.
V.

CONCLUSION

A federal constitutional right to community-based treatment and
services may be argued, based upon the Youngberg v. Romeo 132 "reasonableness" standard, by showing a professional consensus equating "minimally adequate" treatment and community-based care. This right,
which protects mentally disabled persons confined in institutions, may be
extended to non-institutionalized persons. Mentally disabled persons
caught in the "revolving door" or at risk of some other state restriction
on liberty based upon their mental disability, as well as those presently
confined in institutions, are entitled to the treatment services which win
enable them to preserve and exercise their liberty.

131. Plaintiffs in MentalHealth Association v. Deukmejian argued that the chronically mentally disabled "at risk" of rehospitalization, like mentally disabled persons confined in state
institutions, have a constitutional right to "minimally adequate" treatment. Petition for Review at 23-24, Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1531, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1986) (No. 2 Civ. B 014479) (ordered depublished). Since the trial court and the court of
appeal held that, post-Youngberg, there was no constitutional right to community-based treatment, even for institutionalized mentally disabled persons, neither court addressed the issue
whether such a right could extend to the "revolving door" population. The court of appeal did
find, however, that plaintiffs were entitled to assert the right to community-based treatment on
behalf of the "at risk" population. Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App. 3d
1531, 1548, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130, 140-41 (1986) (ordered depublished).
132. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

